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INTRODUCTION
Despite some opposing views (cf. Al-
chian and Demsetz, 1972), there is a wide 
recognition of specificity of labour as a re-
source and commodity (Solow, 1990; Ho-
dgson, 1999), which justifies a relatively 
high degree of the regulation of the labour 
market. The regulative measures include 
laws and administrative activities of the sta-
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te; collective bargaining; corporatist bodies 
that facilitate the dialogue among social 
partners (employers  ʼunions, trade unions 
and the government) and social networks 
that constrain the behavioural and policy 
actions of the participants (Regini, 2000). 
The degree and means of regulation of the 
labour market have become highly debated 
political and economic issues in the last 
couple of decades, usually under the as-
sumptions that too much regulation hinders 
the adaptability of an economy, creates or 
maintains higher levels of unemployment 
and discourages job creation. Despite the 
contestability of the issues surrounding 
unemployment benefits and working time, 
most of the debate has been focused on 
wage levels and structures and employ-
ment protection mechanisms, i.e. laws and 
collective agreements that constrain the 
employers  ʼability of firing at will, and the 
costs of hiring or maintaining a particular 
number of employees.
The debate regarding the labour market 
reform has often been championed by main-
stream economists (cf. Becker, 1999, Rut-
kowski, 2003). As OECD (2004: 89) notes, 
most analyses of employment protection 
have been conducted within a framework 
that does not justify its existence. Policy 
advice based on the view that a more flexi-
ble labour market leads to a better econo-
mic performance has also been endorsed 
by some international organisations (e.g. 
World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund), which was particularly pertinent 
in the transition countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe2. Although the reform im-
plementation has sometimes attempted to 
follow neo-liberal prescriptions, the latter 
often had to be compromised due to poli-
tical unfeasibility and/or institutional tra-
ditions of particular countries (cf. Aranda-
renko, 2004). The reform has often revolved 
around the reduction of legal ʻ rigidities  ʼ(i.e. 
employment protection legislation). Both 
legal rights of individual employees and 
the activities of trade unions (e.g. collective 
bargaining, industrial actions) are perceived 
as obstacles to managerial autonomy and the 
restructuring of enterprises, which is viewed 
as a prerequisite of success in the turbulence 
of the global economy. Such ʻrigidities  ʼof 
the labour market raise the costs of hiring and 
firing employees and thus hinder the flexible 
response to shifting economic conditions (in-
cluding external shocks), as well as the entry 
of new firms into the market. What is usually 
proposed instead is deregulation and decen-
tralisation of industrial relations - lowering 
the costs of dismissals, increased use of 
fixed-term and temporary contracts and in-
dividual or firm-level contracting, whereby 
employers and employers design their rela-
tionships in accordance with particular con-
ditions they face (cf. Rutkowski, 2003). The-
re is an important degree of validity in such 
claims: competition in the product market 
and the differentiation of consumption pat-
terns invokes the need for the flexible and 
differentiated production (cf. Harvey, 1990). 
That entails the need for a more flexible de-
ployment of labour, which, however, can be 
implemented in a variety of ways. Moreover, 
although there is no direct causality between 
employment protection legislation (EPL) 
and unemployment, there may be a negative 
relationship between EPL and employment, 
due to lower participation of young and fe-
male employees interested in more flexible 
forms of employment (UNDP, 2003). Howe-
ver, it remains to be seen whether shifting 
2 In the context of South-East Europe, Arandarenko (2004) claims that international organisations with co-
mpeting agendas, such as International Labour Organization and the European Union have been far less inﬂue-
ntial in labour policy reform. He attributes such developments to loan conditionalities imposed by the IMF and 
the World Bank, as well as to more effective articulation and communication of their policies, rather than to the 
overwhelming evidence of the link between labour market ﬂexibility and superior economic performance.
Rev. soc. polit., god. 12, br. 1, str 45-65, Zagreb 2005.
47
Račić D., Babić Z., Podrug N.: Segmentation of the Labour Market...
the balance of power between labour and 
capital through deregulation of the labour 
market is the optimal way for achieving 
flexibility at the levels of firms and sectors. 
Hereby there is likely a difference between 
manufacturing and services. The former re-
quires technological upgrading which could 
be facilitated by trade union co-operation. 
In the case of services, it is questionable 
whether deregulation has similar effects on 
all service sectors. Moreover, stimulation of 
employment growth in low-end consumer 
and social services through deregulation of 
wages and employment protection is often 
a socially undesirable strategy (Esping-An-
dersen and Regini, 2000a) – especially in 
the long term.
The distribution of benefits and costs 
of deregulation is regularly rather uneven 
- both within firms and across the labour 
force. Such reforms tend to reinforce alrea-
dy existing trends within economies and 
societies, as they take on the post-industrial 
features related to globalisation – such as 
weakening of the organised labour, grea-
ter individualisation of risks and rewards, 
and the tendencies toward greater social 
and economic inequality. In post-indu-
strial socio-economic conditions, there is 
a growing difference between the core and 
the periphery of an organisation - between 
employees who develop the ability to reap 
the rewards of the socio-economic chan-
ge and those who lag behind. Although 
the distinction between them is somewhat 
blurred, the line usually follows opportu-
nities (or the lack thereof) of certain groups 
of workers to acquire and utilise knowledge 
and other resources3. Employees whose hu-
man capital gives them either a core position 
within an organisation, or an advantageous 
position in the labour market, are much 
more likely to benefit from the increased 
flexibility of industrial relations than generic 
labour in manufacturing or services, which 
has traditionally used collective means (i.e. 
trade unions) for securing their interests. 
General individualisation, legal protection 
of employees  ʼinterests and phasing out of 
blue-collar jobs have reduced the role of tra-
de unions4. Facing the model of individual 
bargaining, workers without portfolios of 
skills that can secure their prospects in the 
job market find themselves in a complex 
situation. For them, intensified competition 
in the product market, labour market volati-
lity and lack of institutional protection often 
mean that increased responsibility is coupled 
with both low wages and job insecurity. 
Recent policy debates have included 
realisation of the ʻdouble bind  ʼof the cur-
rent labour market trends (Wilthagen and 
Tros, 2003). Simultaneous demands for 
further flexibilisation of labour markets, 
employment and the work organisation, as 
well as for providing security to employees 
(especially to the vulnerable groups of em-
ployees) and the unemployed have engen-
dered the concept of ʻflexicurityʼ. Partial-
ly based on the Dutch and Danish labour 
market reforms in the 1990s5, flexicurity 
can be defined as
3 Senior staff and core knowledge workers have become the most important corporate assets able to enjoy 
autonomy, ﬂexibility and creativity, whereas much of the ʻgeneric labourʼ (Castells, 1998) without sufﬁcient
opportunities to learn - especially lower-ranked, part-time and temporary employees - is often subjected to strict 
control and low career prospects (let alone social status or self-respect).
4 The incapability of trade unions to function in redeﬁned organisational forms, act in service and high-
technology industries and represent new categories of workers (such as women, youth, immigrants and, espe-
cially part-time and ﬁxed-term workers) have contributed to their weakening (Drucker, 1990; Castells, 1996;
Gorter, 2000).
5 The Danish model combines ﬂexibility (high degree labour mobility due to minimal employment protec-
tion legislation), social security (generous unemployment beneﬁts) and active labour market policies (OECD,
2004).
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ʻa policy strategy that attempts, syn-
chronically and in a deliberate way, 
to enhance the flexibility of labour 
markets, the work organisation and la-
bour relations on the one hand, and to 
enhance security – employment security 
and social security – notably for weaker 
groups in and outside the labour market 
on the other hand  ʼ(Wilthagen and Tros, 
2003: 4).
Potentially laudable as an idea, flexi-
curity currently still seems to be under-re-
searched as a concept and underdeveloped 
as a policy strategy, which still waits to be 
translated into politically, socially and eco-
nomically viable policies. The viability and 
effectiveness of the flexicurity approach are 
likely to depend on the availability of sub-
stantial resources, coordinated approach to 
multiple reforms and considerable fine-tu-
ning, as the Danish case demonstrates (cf. 
Madsen, 2002).
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
LABOUR MARKET IN CROATIA
Prior to 1990, the majority of firms 
in Croatia were formally socially owned 
and operated according to the doctrine of 
self-management. The system of industrial 
relations was managed according to two 
main principles: full employment policy 
and egalitarianism. Full employment po-
licy entailed that all healthy working-age 
citizens should be employed. However, 
due to relatively decentralised decision-
making, employment rates were lower than 
in the other Central and Eastern European 
countries and some unemployment also 
existed. Egalitarianism entailed a weak link 
between the contribution of an employee 
and the accompanying financial compensa-
tion. Employees  ʼwages were mostly based 
on the hours worked, regardless of the ef-
fectiveness. Direct results were a very low 
unemployment coupled with overstaffing, 
low labour productivity, high labour costs, 
low motivation of workers and problematic 
criteria of promotion. According to Vujčić 
(1994), in 1988 hidden unemployment, 
i.e. the number of redundant workers that 
were kept employed for social or political 
reasons, was around 300.000, or around 
10 percent of the working age population. 
As for the protection of employee rights, 
since employment protection was semi-
explicitly embedded in economic and so-
cial policies of full employment, we can 
talk about ʻquasi-legal protection  ʼ of the 
position of employees regarding their work 
status and some material rights such as wa-
ges, as well as pension and social welfare 
contributions. There have also been issues 
where rights were protected less strongly 
and where discrimination, nepotism and 
political influences occurred. Higher hie-
rarchical positions and the status associa-
ted with them were mostly occupied by the 
Party members. Elements of social policy 
(e.g. housing and subsidised purchases) that 
were related to employment also enabled a 
degree of manipulation. Trade unions and 
the only trade union federation were con-
trolled by the Party. The judiciary system 
oscillated between relative independence 
and political influences.
Since the product market already exi-
sted, restoration of market economy in 
Croatia primarily consisted of the introduc-
tion of market-based relations into capital 
and labour relations. Both were primarily 
done through privatisation. By selling off 
firms to private owners, the state was giving 
up responsibility for the assets that constitu-
ted those firms, including their employees. 
In order to balance this process, building of 
institutions associated with effective market 
economy within a democratic political sy-
stem was needed. The definition and distri-
bution of economic assets through privati-
sation had to be complemented by defining, 
enforcing and modifying legal and social 
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frameworks steering business transactions 
and the agents engaged in them. Although 
privatisation and institution building were 
expected to contribute to the constitution of 
privately owned firms and legal and social 
prerequisites for their effective functioning, 
characterised by both accountability and 
profitability - both of them have been mi-
smanaged to a significant extent, which had 
a significant impact on industrial relations 
and the labour market. The complexity of 
the privatisation model was not balanced 
by strong legal frameworks and indepen-
dent judiciary, which enabled widespread 
political influences, arbitrariness, nepoti-
sm and corruption (cf. Franičević, 1999). 
Widespread neglect of new owners towards 
the acquired companies (cf. UNDP, 1998) 
has extended from physical and financial 
resources to employees. On the one hand, 
there was an increased tendency towards 
authoritarianism. When the political transi-
tion began, ideological motives and a lack 
of incentives had already endowed workers  ʼ
participation in decision-making with an 
unfavourable reputation. Since the central 
privatisation issue was not efficiency im-
provement, but gaining control, the trend 
has not changed. A tendency towards cen-
tralisation of management and leadership 
accompanied by marginalisation of other 
employees (especially of the middle mana-
gement) has been noted in many Croatian 
enterprises (Sikavica, 1997). The privatisa-
tion process favoured insiders and indivi-
duals connected to the political elite. It was 
also coupled with the structural problems of 
the economy. That resulted in lay-offs and 
sharp unemployment growth. Unemploy-
ment started to grow in the late eighties, 
when some market principles were introdu-
ced in the Croatian economy. Hidden unem-
ployment led to a sharp increase in registe-
red unemployment at the beginning of the 
transition process. That was further reinfor-
ced by the strategy of defensive restructu-
ring of firms (cf. Vehovec and Domadenik, 
2002). Due to the lack of affordable sour-
ces of finance, and intensified competitive 
pressures from domestic and foreign firms, 
managers were much more focused on cost 
reductions than on the finding new market 
opportunities, which could increase the vo-
lume of business and reduce the negative 
impacts on the labour force. Moreover, the 
taxation system favoured the substitution of 
labour for capital. High payroll taxes and 
social welfare in contributions led to high 
unit labour costs (at least in the first stage of 
transition)6, whereas the taxation of capital 
gains and interest was non-existent. Under 
such conditions, managers usually opted to 
reduce costs, cut employment and improve 
productivity. For many firms, especially the 
privatised ones, downsizing has become a 
prerequisite for a survival in a more com-
petitive environment. Average firm size has 
almost halved, decreasing from over 22 em-
ployees in 1993 to about 12 employees in 
2000 (Rutkowski, 2003)7. Employment rate 
dropped from 57.7 percent in 1991 to 50.9 
percent in 2001. The outflow was roughly 
equally distributed by inflows into unem-
ployment and inactivity, including early or 
disability retirement. Long-term unemploy-
ment8 accounts for 53 percent of total unem-
ployment, which explains a large number 
of discouraged workers who often drift into 
6 In the course of several tax system reforms, payroll taxes and social welfare contributions were signiﬁca-
ntly reduced. In 2001 they were lower than the average for the EU ﬁrst round accession countries.
7 It should be emphasised that average ﬁrm size was also strongly inﬂuenced by emergence of new SMEs.
According to a calculation by Vedran Šošić, only 36 percent of the differential in average ﬁrm size between
1993 and 2001 resulted from layoffs.
8 Long-term unemployment occurs when workers fail to ﬁnd new paid employment after six months of
unemployment.
50
Rev. soc. polit., god. 12, br. 1, str 45-65, Zagreb 2005. Račić D., Babić Z., Podrug N.: Segmentation of the Labour Market...
inactivity (UNDP, 2003). After a decade of 
transition, Croatia still has very high rates of 
registered unemployment (18.5 percent9). 
The ILO measure was at 14.4 percent in the 
second half of 2002. Moreover, the gover-
nment in early nineties allowed a wide use 
of early retirement schemes, as a seemingly 
convenient way to reduce unemployment fi-
gures and social problems at the same time. 
Consequently, a sharp growth of the num-
ber of new retirees occurred between 1990 
and 1994 (around 200.000 new retirees), 
which caused a dramatic fall of the ratio of 
employed to retired persons (from 3.00 in 
1990 to 1.97 in 1994 and 1.36 in 2001). The 
need to finance the corresponding pension 
fund and budget deficits entailed high taxes 
on labour. Even though these taxes were 
eventually lowered, wage growth robustly 
surpassed productivity growth in the period 
1994-2001, resulting in high labour costs. 
That contributed to lower competitiveness 
of enterprises, especially in labour-inten-
sive sectors, reinforcing the trend of job 
shedding (as outlined above), and weake-
ning the export performance.
Also, transition brought about labour 
reallocation from large socialist firms (es-
pecially in traditional manufacturing) and 
the public sector to services, new private 
SME and self-employment. Restructuring 
of the economy entailed a shift from ma-
nufacturing to services, much of which oc-
curred due to the lack of competitiveness of 
domestic manufacturers and rapid growth 
of imports. The structure of employment by 
firm size has thus changed. Employment in 
large firms went down by almost 5 percent 
per annum between 1993 and 2000. The 
same trend appeared in medium-sized fir-
ms, although less precipitously (by about 
4 percent annually). At the same time, 
employment in small firms increased by 
over 8 percent per annum. Looking from a 
different perspective, employment in state-
owned firms fell by over 12 percent while 
in private firms increased by 11 percent 
(Rutkowski, 2003). However, employment 
growth in the SME sector has not been suffi-
cient to offset the losses in the public sector 
and larger companies, which contributed to 
the problems discussed above.
Most SMEs engage in retail trade, cost-
competition in standardised products and 
services with low innovative content, whi-
ch generally entails low skill levels. At the 
same time, one would expect low levels of 
unionisation in such enterprises. Restruc-
turing and the growth of the SME sector 
occurred in turbulent circumstances – ran-
ging from the war for independence to pri-
vatisation and various institutional reforms, 
many of which have been coupled with the 
institutional insufficiency and arbitrariness 
of the state administration. In the following 
section we examine whether these proces-
ses resulted in increased segmentation of 
the labour market and high vulnerability of 
particular groups of employees regarding 
the protection of their rights.
FUNCTIONING OF LABOUR 
MARKET INSTITUTIONS
In this section we tackle the main insti-
tutions that characterise the labour market 
and define the scope of employee rights, 
including the labour law, trade unions, 
collective agreements and tripartite social 
dialogue, simultaneously examining their 
effects on the segmentation of the labour 
market.
Labour Law 
Croatia has developed an institutional 
framework regulating industrial relations 
9 The recent decrease in registered employment rates has more to do with more strict application of the rules 
related to that status, than to newly created jobs.  
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that is very similar to the more developed 
Continental European countries. Labour 
Law, which was adopted in 1995 (Official 
Gazette 38/95)10 and came into effect in 1996, 
used to be the cornerstone of that framework. 
Apart from the individual employee rights11, 
the Law also dealt with the collective rights: 
worker participation in decision-making 
through work councils, the establishment 
and activity of trade unions, collective agree-
ments, the peaceful settlement of collective 
labour disputes, strikes and lock-outs, and the 
establishment of the Economic and Social 
Council as a tripartite body for the facilitation 
of the social dialogue.
During the last decade, unemployment 
has been perceived as a major economic 
and social problem. According to some 
interpretations, the Labour Law played a 
major role in discouraging the employers 
to take up new employees, due to relati-
vely high costs of their dismissal. Indivi-
dual dismissals were costly due to the long 
advanced notice period and high severance 
pay. Severance pay was determined as two 
weeks of salary per year of service, with no 
upper limit. Laying-off redundant workers 
was difficult and costly due to both high 
procedural and monetary costs of dismis-
sals. Employment protection regulation in 
Croatia by some researchers was among the 
strictest in Europe (Biondić et al., 2002). 
Inflexibility of the Croatian labour market 
was reflected in a high value of a compo-
site index of the strictness of employment 
protection legislation (EPL) developed by 
OECD12. When compared to other coun-
tries, Croatia had the second highest value 
of the index (3.6), which was significantly 
higher than the OECD average (2.0), EU 
countries (2.4) and the transition countries 
for which the data exists (2.2). Main gene-
rators of such conditions were complicated 
dismissal procedures and the restrictions on 
temporary contracts, as well as unlawful 
and collective dismissals.
The actual liberalisation of the labour 
market in Croatia started much before the 
legislative one. This can be measured by 
the structure of employment contracts ac-
cording to duration, because fixed-term and 
temporary contracts entail a lower level of 
rights than permanent contracts. A compa-
rison between 1997 and 2002 reveals an 
increase in temporary employment and a 
fall in permanent employment (see Table 
1). Temporary contracts became shorter in 
average, with a particularly sharp increase 
of the proportion of contracts expiring in 
less than five months (see Table 2). Based 
on the 2001 Labour Force Survey, Ru-
tkowski (2003) estimated the incidence of 
temporary employment contracts in the case 
newly created jobs at 55 percent.
10 The Law was subsequently corrected and/or amended several times (cf. Ofﬁcial Gazette 54/95, 65/95,
17/01 and 82/01).
11 The Law explicitly addresses the rights connected to life, health, privacy and dignity, education and tra-
ining rights, motherhood rights, protection of permanent or temporary disabled employees and right to partic-
ipate in decision-making.
12 EPL index is calculated as a weighted average of 22 indicators that quantify different procedures, costs, 
limitations and terms related to cancellation of the employment contract. One could be critical about the deﬁn-
ition of the index component tackling unlawful dismissals, which accounts for 13 percent of the total value of 
the EPL index. Hereby the compensation and the obligation of the employer to return an unlawfully dismissed 
worker to an appropriate position take up 50 percent of the component, which seems inappropriate.
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Table 2.
Duration of ﬁxed-term and temporary contracts - in 1997 and 2002.
Employment contract duration 1997 % 2002 %
Less than 1 month 4,402 2.9 4,851 3.1
Between 1 and 5  months 30,678 20.3 80,046 51.6
Between 6 and 12  months 31.773 21.0 24.406 15.7
1 year or more 22.934 15.1 13.830 8.9
Employment at will 61.685 40.7 32.109 20.7
Total 151.471 100 155.242 100
Source: Crnković-Pozaić (2004)
Table 1.  
Employment contracts by duration – in 1997 and 2002.
Types of employment contracts 1997 % 2002 %
Permanent contracts 1,147,803 88.3 1,092,040 87.5
Fixed-term and temporary  contracts 87,416 6.7 121,161 9.7
Seasonal contracts 25,948 2.0 16,034 1.3
Speciﬁc assignment contracts 38,107 2.9 18,905 1.5
Total 1,299,274 100.0 1,248,140 100
Source: Crnković-Pozaić (2004)
The initial stage of reform enabled the 
foundation of private employment agen-
cies. Other legislative inadequacies, which 
have been perceived both by the domestic 
social partners and the international insti-
tutions, were expected to be addressed by 
the Labour Law reform. So a debate has 
been initiated by the government, with the 
intention of reaching a consensus with the 
representatives of trade unions and em-
ployers. Many of the amendments propo-
sed were not markedly contentious, but an 
intense public debate emerged around three 
main issues: severance payments, dismissal 
periods, and the definition of micro enter-
prises (whereby dismissal procedures are 
less strict)13.  Despite a basic agreement 
that some employee rights regarding se-
verance payments and dismissal periods 
should be somewhat reduced, the degrees 
13 All these issues would require concessions by trade union representatives, to which the overall membership 
was strongly opposed. Moreover, ﬂexibilisation would weaken the relative position of trade unions. That made
the issue of devising means of compensation to trade unions also a subject of negotiations. A partial solution was 
found in introduction of compulsory contributions of non-members to trade unions (based upon referenda) and 
in the increase of the maximum level of unemployment beneﬁts (by 11 percent). The aforementioned referenda 
mostly pertain to the public sector, where universal coverage of collective agreements prevails.
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and the applicability of those reductions 
have been contested by trade unions. What 
sparked an even more intense debate was 
the definition of micro-enterprises, which 
are subject to less labour regulation, inclu-
ding easier conditions for dismissals. The 
old Law set the threshold at 10 employees, 
whereas the proposal was to increase it to 
20 employees14. The Croatian Employers  ʼ
Association strongly supported the proposal 
as a way to extend the autonomy of small 
entrepreneurs, and the trade unions saw it 
as a way of reduction of employee rights 
that neither produced any benefits for them 
nor was compensated by some other con-
cessions. The consensus has become unat-
tainable, but in July 2003 the Parliament 
nevertheless adopted the amendments to the 
Labour Law (Official Gazette 114/03) that 
adopted most of the changes. Although all 
components of the EPL index were reduced, 
reforms affecting temporary employment 
had the greatest impact15. The new value 
of the EPL index (2.8) still places Croatia 
among the more regulated labour markets 
in transition countries (cf. Matković and 
Biondić, 2003).
The new Law and other regulatory chan-
ges should bring some new incentives to a 
greater participation in the labour market, 
but will not automatically create an effec-
tive labour market, let alone a pattern of 
sustainable job creation. The experiences 
of some other countries, such as Spain (cf. 
Toharia and Malo, 2000), demonstrate that 
deregulation and flexibilisation of tempo-
rary employment contracts (especially if the 
regulation of permanent contracts remains 
mostly unchanged) can engender a dual 
labour market. Hereby ʻinsiders  ʼ tend to 
retain permanent positions and ʻsemi-out-
siders  ʼoccupy inferior labour market posi-
tions in which temporary work is accepted 
because few permanent jobs are available. 
Another potential pitfall comes from asym-
metries whereby firing is not followed by 
hiring, as it has occurred in Italy (Samek 
Lodovici, 2000b). More generally, empiri-
cal evidence from OECD countries suggests 
in the 1990s the occurrence of temporary 
contracts has grown faster in countries 
where their regulation has been signifi-
cantly eased in relation to the regulation 
of permanent contracts (OECD, 2004)16. 
The Croatian case brought simultaneous 
deregulation of permanent and temporary 
contracts, with the latter being more pro-
nounced. Although the available theories 
emphasise the relative difference in regula-
tion of permanent and temporary contracts 
as the critical factor that engenders labour 
market duality, empirical evidence of the 
outcomes of simultaneous reforms of both 
contract forms is scarce (cf. OECD, 2004). 
It remains to be seen whether liberalisation 
of the Croatian Labour Law will intensify 
the substitution of permanent employment 
contracts by the fixed-term and temporary 
ones or not. If it does, the position of ʻ flex-
workers  ʼin the labour market may weaken 
even further, due to an ineffective judicial 
system and low levels of unionisation.
Trade Unions
Workers in Croatia are entitled by law to 
form or join unions of their own choosing 
without prior authorisation.  The participa-
14 The threshold was eventually set at 20 employees, but the leeway given to micro-enterprises was reduced: 
the employer now needs to state a justiﬁed cause for dismissals.
15 The initial proposal also included extensive deregulation of temporary employment and reduced seve-
rance payments and dismissal periods for long-term employees of a company, which would have reduced the 
value of the EPL index to 2.25 (Matković and Biondić, 2003).
16 Stricter rules applied to regular contracts ʻmay tend to increase the incidence of temporary work and to 
limit the extent to which temporary contracts will be converted into permanent ones  ʼ(OECD, 2004: 87).
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tion rate in trade unions is decreasing. In 
1994, the proportion of workers belonging 
to trade unions was approximately 60-70 
percent. In 2002, it was around 45-55 per-
cent. The negative trends can be explained 
by privatisation and restructuring of the 
economy, and change of the age structu-
re of the working population (Cimeša and 
Marinković Drača, 2002). The former re-
sulted in a higher proportion of companies 
in which unionisation is either considered 
unnecessary or actively discouraged. Mo-
reover, younger employees are less likely to 
join trade unions. They are mostly engaged 
in fixed-term and temporary employment 
contracts and their level of identification 
with trade unions is lower. There is no data 
on the total number of employees to whom 
collective bargaining agreements apply. In 
the public sector, the application of such 
agreements is usually universal. Collective 
bargaining in the private sector is both more 
decentralised and less common, so the co-
verage of employees is somewhat lower. 
The labour movement involves six na-
tional labour federations. Unionisation is 
associated with a relatively strong posi-
tion in the labour market. All federations 
seem to represent a proportion of the core 
workforce, usually the employees of larger 
companies and public sector, whose intere-
sts are relatively well protected. However, 
the unions  ʼ actions for the protection of 
the rights of existing employees may harm 
the unemployed and thus deepen the in-
sider-outsider divide. However, there are 
internal differences among the federations 
stemming from the division of their mem-
bership according to sectors. Membership 
structure has important implications on the 
negotiating positions of the federations. The 
largest federation, Union of Autonomous 
Trade Unions (UATUC), gathers 46 percent 
of all unionised workers (Gatarić, 2004), 
most of them in manufacturing, retail trade 
and hospitality industry. Their membership 
is declining due to declining employment 
in traditional manufacturing and substitu-
tion of unionised jobs by the non-unioni-
sed ones. The second largest federation, 
Independent Trade Unions of Croatia (19 
percent of total union membership) encom-
passes former or current state monopolies in 
oil and petrochemicals, electricity genera-
tion and transmission, telecommunications, 
postal services, as well as the employees in 
financial institutions. Of three other major 
federations, one (Union of Public Service 
Trade Unions) represents public sector em-
ployees, whereas the other two are more 
heterogeneous. Since four federations share 
the target group (employees in the business 
sector), there is a competitive struggle for 
members, which involves not only com-
petitive lowering of membership fees and 
decentralisation of spending decisions to 
the firm level, but also takeovers of other 
trade unions  ʼmembers. The struggle for the 
membership base undermines the relation-
ships between federations and the forma-
tion of the common position in the social 
dialogue with the employers (cf. Cimeša 
and Marinković Drača, 2002).
Collective Bargaining
The system of social dialogue is rather 
complicated. It takes place at four different 
levels i.e. at national, regional, sector, and 
company levels. A crucial role is given to 
the process of collective bargaining, which 
takes place at sector and company levels17. 
Collective bargaining is adequately regula-
ted by the Labour Law, but its application 
is patchy and often fraught with problems. 
Mutually beneficial agreements occur 
mainly in larger and more resourceful priva-
17 National and regional levels of social dialogue mainly occur through Economic and Social Council, wh-
ich is tackled in the next section of the paper.
Rev. soc. polit., god. 12, br. 1, str 45-65, Zagreb 2005.
55
Račić D., Babić Z., Podrug N.: Segmentation of the Labour Market...
te firms, and agreements are also regularly 
reached in public services and state-owned 
monopolies. However, the public sector 
agreements are often conditional upon 
excessive government concessions to trade 
unions, which thus often follow maximalist 
negotiation strategies. The involvement of 
public-sector trade unions contributes to a 
more egalitarian wage distribution than in 
other transition countries (cf. Rutkowski, 
2003), but also results in marked wage 
differentials between public and private 
sectors. The graph below compares the 
wage dynamics in public sector and ma-
nufacturing between 1998 and 2002. The 
wage differentials, which vary between 20 
and 60 percent, cannot be attributed solely 
to educational differences between sectors. 
They reflect the fact that manufacturing is 
mostly privatised, the level of unionisation 
is lower, and collective bargaining is more 
decentralised, which means that collective 
agreements do not cover all the employees. 
Sharp growth of these differentials in 1999 
shows the influence of an attempt of the 
government to steer the election results by 
pre-election wage increases in the public 
sector.
Underdevelopment of the social dia-
logue is acknowledged by all parties, al-
though the government is still more likely 
to participate in collective agreements. The 
problems encountered in the social dialo-
gue in companies are related to the lack 
of motivation and initiative on both sides. 
Managers often display a tendency towards 
centralised decision-making accompanied 
by marginalisation of other employees. Un-
der such conditions, most employees are 
not interested to contribute more than it is 
required, because of low likelihood of the 
success of their efforts. Moreover, workers  ʼ
participation in decision-making has an un-
favourable reputation due to the past expe-
riences of self-management. Consequently, 
Graph 1.
Average Net Wage Ratio - Public Administration / Manufacturing, 1998-2002.
Source: CBS
Average Net Wage Ratio
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although the law enables the existence of 
employee councils in firms with more than 
20 employees, their implementation has not 
produced discernible results.
According to Cimeša and Marinković 
Drača (2002), private sector shows many 
examples of employers  ʼprocrastination to 
engage in negotiations and failures to ful-
fil the existing collective agreements, whi-
ch results in a negative climate in further 
co-operation. Employers and trade unions 
find themselves in positional negotiation 
whereby both parties maximise their clai-
ms, which seemingly ensures their credi-
bility in relation to their key stakeholders 
(shareholders and trade union members, 
respectively). However, the escalation of 
conflict becomes detrimental for both sides, 
because it locks them in an unproductive 
relationship in which is nearly impossible 
to build trust and effective partnership in 
the development of the enterprise. Moreo-
ver, lack of trust does not only affect the 
relationships at firm or sector levels, where 
collective bargaining occurs. It becomes a 
negative factor in the tripartite dialogue, 
therefore hindering the possibilities for an 
effective social partnership.
Tripartite Social Dialogue
At the level of the whole economy, ef-
forts have been made to build an effecti-
ve tripartite social partnership among the 
government, private employers and trade 
unions, but the results have been modera-
te. The central body that should provide the 
representation of these interests at the natio-
nal level is the Economic and Social Coun-
cil (ESC), which was established in 2001. 
It is established as a consultative body that 
should facilitate co-ordinated economic and 
social policies, encourage effective collecti-
ve bargaining, implementation of collective 
agreements and reconciliation among part-
ners when necessary. At the regional level, 
there are also ESCs in most counties, who-
se role is to deal with similar issues from a 
more practical perspective18.
Functioning of the ESC has been bur-
dened by the ambiguous position of the 
government as a social partner. Despite 
the participation of the highest-ranking of-
ficials (such as Deputy Prime Minister) on 
the ESC, its recommendations do not bind 
the government19, which results in misun-
derstandings and conflicts. Evaluations 
of functioning of the ESC by the social 
partners differ considerably (Cimeša and 
Marinković Drača, 2002). In addition to 
generally positive opinions, government 
officials still claim that the other two par-
ties are unrealistic and reluctant to assume 
responsibility for difficult decisions. From 
the employers  ʼperspective (which is mainly 
advocated by the Croatian Employerʼs 
Union20), trade unions fragmentation21 hin-
ders the effectiveness of collective bargai-
ning processes. As the trade unions repre-
sent different types of workers, they often 
follow different negotiating strategies. That 
may even produce an advantageous nego-
tiating position for Croatian Employerʼs 
18 There are also other bodies that should play a supportive role in the social dialogue. The governmental 
Ofﬁce for Social Partnership was established in 2001 to support the work of the ESC. Social partners also pa-
rticipate as external members of parliamentary committees (work, health and social policy; ﬁnance and state
budget; economy, development, and reconstruction), and various quasi-governmental institutions.
19 Recommendations of the ESC are just an input into the legislative procedure, and the position of the go-
vernment may deviate from it due to other considerations. An important factor has been the divisions among 
the parties in the government. 
20 Croatian Employerʼs Association is the main private sector employers  ʼorganization in Croatia. Its 5.000 
corporate members have more than 300.000 employees.
21 There are representatives of 5 trade union federations on the ESC.
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Union. The main trade union representa-
tives  ʼcomplaint addresses the insufficient 
involvement of trade unions in the initial 
stages of the legislative process, when the 
crucial outlines of new regulations are de-
bated. Their involvement in later stages is 
thus often reduced to a choice between en-
dorsement and opposition to new legisla-
tive proposals.
Until the end of 2001 the ESC functio-
ned with some difficulties, but some agree-
ments were reached, including the Partner-
ship for Development. Hereby almost all 
main social partners (with the exception of 
third largest trade union federation) agreed 
on 17 goals related to economic and social 
issues. Its implementation required the 
agreement on four documents dealing with 
social policy, wage policy, restructuring and 
privatisation, and an analysis of the Euro-
pean Social Charter. None of these docu-
ments was agreed upon and endorsed by 
the end of March 2002, as initially agreed. 
Moreover, meanwhile the government pu-
blished the proposal of amendments to the 
Labour Law, with which the trade unions 
strongly disagreed. Consequently, the lar-
gest trade union federation UATUC left 
the Partnership for Development, soon to 
be followed by other federations, which 
effectively meant the agreementʼs collapse. 
That had substantial consequences on the 
relationships among the social partners and 
the functioning of the ESC, and was fur-
ther reinforced by the debate surrounding 
the Labour Law amendments (see above). 
Despite the ineffectiveness and distrust 
characterising the ESC, in 2002 the repre-
sentatives of the same social partners (with 
the addition of representatives of academic 
community) gathered within an additional 
consultative body - the National Competi-
tiveness Council, whose results are yet to 
be seen.
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYEE 
RIGHTS
As stated above, the legislation defines 
a comprehensive scope of employee ri-
ghts, and anecdotal evidence suggests that 
many of them are occasionally endangered. 
However, since most of the labour dispu-
tes revolve around the fulfilment of finan-
cial obligations, it makes sense to focus on 
them. This does not imply that the protec-
tion of other rights is less important, but the 
reliable data on them is scarce. Few such 
violations are reported, let alone followed 
by legal action. That can be explained by 
factors like widespread authoritarianism of 
managerial practices, high unemployment 
and inefficient judiciary, each of which re-
duces the likelihood of reporting. In some 
cases, some indications are provided by ag-
gregate data22, or occasional surveys.
Wage Issues
Wage arrears were one the most serious 
problems in the Croatian labour market. 
The number of affected workers grew 
from 55.000 in 1993 to 140.000 in 1998. 
In 2001 around 92.000, which represented 
7.2 percent of the employed, did not recei-
ve their wages and associated taxes and 
social welfare contributions on time. Until 
the 2001 amendments to the Labour Law, 
workers were not allowed to strike for that 
reason. Since the failure to pay wages was 
often caused by insolvency of enterprises, 
the problems often accumulated over time. 
In non-performing state-owned enterprises 
22 For instance, during the last ﬁve years women have comprised almost three ﬁfths of ﬁrst-time job seekers
(cf. HZZ, 2004). That may be partly attributable to their occupational choices and dependence of some social 
security entitlements on unemployment status (which was abandoned in 2002). However, it also suggests a de-
gree of discrimination of women due to uncertainty regarding their family plans.
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a common occurrence was the exertion 
of political pressure on the government 
in order to obtain subsidies to pay wages, 
which usually only prolonged the enterpri-
ses  ʼ agony. Bankruptcies and liquidation 
of enterprises entailed different problems, 
because employees  ʼclaims were not secu-
red against specific assets (like many bank 
loans), which meant that the likelihood 
of their fulfilment was low. An additional 
problem was that the employees whose em-
ployers failed to pay the contributions into 
the social welfare system associated to wa-
ges were denied health coverage – until the 
Constitutional Court ruled otherwise.
Due to high unemployment, and ine-
fficiencies of judiciary system and state in-
spectoral agencies, there are several other 
problematic practices. According to the 
estimates by the Croatian Employment 
Service and State Inspectoral Agency, there 
were around 120.000 people illegally em-
ployed in the unofficial economy in 200123, 
which implied a low protection of their 
rights24. According to the State Pension 
Insurance Fund, in 2000 around 200.000 
workers were reported as receivers of the 
minimum wage. However, a large number 
of workers in SMEs seemingly receive the 
minimum wage because that minimises the 
associated taxes and social welfare contri-
butions, i.e. the employers  ʼcost of labour. 
However, when the minimum wage is lower 
than the market wage for their jobs, such 
workers also receive additional payments in 
cash or, more rarely, through fictitious con-
tracts. Due to the differences in taxes and 
social welfare contributions, such practices 
deprive the state budget and its pension and 
health funds of significant resources. Sin-
ce the introduction of the private pension 
funds in 2002, employees (as future bene-
ficiaries of those funds) have been losing 
resources too. The proportion of workers 
declared on the minimum wage in 2000 
was highest in service sectors low skill 
jobs prevail25 (Madžarević-Šujster, 2002). 
Most of the employees on the minimum 
wage work in small companies, where 17 
percent of all employees purportedly recei-
ved the minimum wage, and the average 
net wage was 23 percent lower than in the 
rest of the business sector (FINA, 2003). 
The employees of the public sector and 
larger companies are in a much better situa-
tion regarding wage rate, job security and 
employee rights. Finally, there is the issue 
of the wage discrimination of women. On 
average, womenʼs earnings are compara-
tively lower – regardless of their age and 
duration of employment (Crnković-Pozaić, 
2004). On the other hand, the differentials 
between wages of men and women, which 
have been observed in 2002 (10 percent)26, 
were lower than in any other transition 
country. Moreover, they were small even 
in comparison with most OECD countries 
(Šošić, 2004).
Labour Disputes
There were about 35.000 unresolved la-
bour disputes at Croatian courts in 2002. 70 
percent of the disputes are linked with wa-
ges arrears and other material claims, some 
tackle unlawful dismissals etc. The burden 
23 The share of unofﬁcial economy in GDP is estimated at around 10 percent.
24 Some of them were simultaneously registered as unemployed because that status entailed certain welfare 
beneﬁts. The reform of 2002 began to link the beneﬁts to a personʼs social status, rather than the (un)employ-
ment status (UNDP, 2003).
25 These were construction (17 percent), wholesale and retail trade (16 percent) and hotels and restaurants 
(11 percent).
26 This ﬁgure should be treated with caution, because it does not take into account the characteristics of in-
dividual employees (e.g. education and experience) or particular jobs (cf. Šošić, 2004).
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of ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the 
judiciary system is disproportionately borne 
by the low-wage workers. Due to their low 
negotiating power and weak position in the 
labour market, they are more likely to face 
the violations of rights. It is likely that some 
employers take advantage of institutional 
inefficiency of the judicial system, knowing 
that rectification of wrongdoings may not 
even happen. Engaging in legal disputes is 
risky and costly, and the problems of the 
judicial system hinder the opportunities of 
low-wage workers to exercise their rights 
and receive compensation for the infringe-
ments. Trade unions make attempts to pro-
tect that category of workers, but they pri-
mary serve the interests of their members, 
which mostly come from the public sector 
and larger companies. Since unionisation is 
lowest in small firms, where low wages are 
relatively more common, the protection of 
their rights is weak. On the other hand, the 
courts are also processing a large number 
of lawsuits whereby employees in the pu-
blic sector, partly assisted by trade unions, 
sue the government ministries due to the 
latterʼs failure to fulfil minor claims em-
bedded in collective agreements. Having 
tackled 202.812 labour disputes initiated 
between 1996 and 2003, Crnić (2004) notes 
a decrease in the number of disputes revol-
ving around dismissals, and a significant 
increase in the number of disputes initiated 
by employees because of employees  ʼfailure 
to fulfil specific material claims.
THE EFFECTS OF LABOUR 
MARKET POLICIES
Although there are no comprehensive 
data, there are indications that Croatian 
labour market policies are not sufficien-
tly aimed at improving the position of the 
worst-off categories of employees and the 
unemployed. In this section we examine the 
main effects of passive and active labour 
market policies on the segmentation of the 
labour market.
Passive Labour Market Policies
Passive labour policy27 has as a goal the 
improvement and protection of the material 
status of the unemployed. The unemploy-
ment allowance represents the most signifi-
cant policy measure in terms of its costs and 
coverage of the unemployed. According to 
UNDP (2003), the monetary compensation 
in Croatia does not vary significantly from 
the averages of the other CEE countries, 
regarding the proportion to the average sa-
lary (26 percent) and maximum duration 
of the rights (one year). Furthermore, total 
expenditure level on passive measures in 
Croatia, measured as a proportion of GDP, 
is similar to other transition countries. 
However, Croatia differs in terms of the 
lowest coverage of the unemployed (18.5 
percent of individuals registered with the 
Croatian Employment Service receive the 
allowance). This is a direct consequence 
of higher youth unemployment rates, who 
have less working experience. Consequen-
tly, their rights to unemployment allowance, 
if they have it at all, are quickly exhausted. 
Therefore, it would be justified to increa-
se the number of individuals, especially in 
the younger age groups28, who would have 
the right to the unemployment allowance. 
There is also the need to improve the ef-
ficiency of the funds being spent, and to 
establish links between passive and active 
policy measures, which would increase the 
employability of the unemployed persons, 
27 Passive policy measures may include unemployment allowance, pension schemes, health insurance, right 
to childʼs allowance and various forms of material insurance.
28 Furthermore, an effect in improved position of young people, especially through easier entrance into em-
ployment, is expected from the ﬂexibilisation of the Labour Law.
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which is particularly pertinent in the case of 
long-term unemployed, which account for 
majority of unemployed persons.
Active Labour Market Policies 
Active policy measures (ALMP) are 
used to reach more effective outcomes in 
the labour market through the removal of 
imperfections that exist in it, as well as 
through the modification of market out-
comes towards socially acceptable ones. 
The goal is to increase employment and 
the wages of particular categories in the 
labour market that seem to be particularly 
exposed to the risk of unemployment and 
poverty. According to UNDP (2003), the 
expenditure levels on ALMP in Croatia do 
not differ significantly from the advanced 
transition countries, but its structure does. 
In recent years, the emphasis was on wage 
subsidies, measures stimulating self-em-
ployment and small enterprises as well as 
job search assistance. In OECD and many 
transition countries, most resources are 
spent on training programmes, job search 
assistance and public works. The new cycle 
of active policy measures, which started in 
2002, focused again on subsidising wages, 
with too strong emphasis placed on young 
university-educated individuals who consti-
tute only 1 percent of the registered unem-
ployment and are largely well-positioned in 
the labour market. Furthermore, the mea-
sures target 95 percent of all unemployed 
persons.  Non-specific definition of target 
groups may somewhat increase the overall 
employment, but it often leads to insuffi-
cient creation of employment chances for 
the most endangered groups. Current resul-
ts indicate a favourable impact on middle 
age workers unemployed for at least sixth 
months, and opportunities for stronger im-
pact on the first-time job seekers who have 
completed secondary vocational education 
(Babić, 2003). Given the structural dispro-
portions in the labour market, future ALMP 
should be directed towards adjustment of 
the qualification structure of the labour 
force in accordance with labour demand, 
and on (re)training of groups experiencing 
the most difficulty in finding employment. 
A systematic evaluation of the effects of 
ALMP, followed by their adjustment in 




The conditions of employment contracts 
are governed by laws, collective bargai-
ning, and individual contracts. The level of 
flexibility of industrial relations is neither 
economically nor socio-politically neutral. 
Although laws and contracts are both legal-
ly enforceable, they differ in their levels of 
generality, design processes, flexibility they 
offer to employers and employees, and in 
implications for different groups of em-
ployees. More general instruments (laws 
and more centralised collective bargaining) 
predominantly define the position of relati-
vely vulnerable groups of employees. The 
better-positioned categories of employees 
display stronger tendencies towards decen-
tralised collective bargaining and flexible 
individual contracting. All these institutions 
require an effective legal system offering 
not only sufficient legal provisions, but also 
a prompt resolution of labour disputes and 
sanctioning of rights violations. Although 
employee rights seemingly act just as con-
straints that limit the autonomy of the firm 
in the labour-related decisions, towards 
which they may often be opposed. Howe-
ver, such rights have both enabling and 
constraining aspects – for instance, through 
positive effects on employee morale or co-
operative attitudes of labour unions which 
facilitate productivity improvements. Any 
rights need to be rooted in an effective le-
gal system offering not only sufficient legal 
provisions, but also prompt resolution of 
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labour disputes and sanctioning of the vio-
lations of the employees  ʼrights. The latter is 
especially important in the cases of the most 
vulnerable categories of employees. 
There are significant deviations from 
these principles in the reality of the Croa-
tian labour market. There are notable diffe-
rences in the levels of protection of rights 
of different categories of employees, with 
particularly burdensome situations faced 
by the long-term unemployed. On the one 
hand, there are the employees in the public 
sector and larger and more advanced com-
panies, who tend to be highly unionised 
and occupy relatively secure and well-paid 
jobs with adequate working conditions (cf. 
Rutkowski, 2003). On the other hand, there 
are many employees, mostly in the SME 
sector, whose rights are more easily endan-
gered and even violated. This is reinforced 
by the concentration of the SME sector in 
low-skill / low-value-added activities, whi-
ch is associated with the weak position in 
the labour market of such employees. Con-
sequently, despite a relatively more egalita-
rian wage distribution than in other transi-
tion countries, the incidence of low pay is 
quite high. Over 20 percent of all Croatian 
employees earn less than two-thirds of the 
median wage (although this figure could be 
somewhat inflated by underreporting wa-
ges). In the EU countries, that figure rarely 
exceeds 15 percent (cf. Rutkowski, 2003). 
Similar patterns of segmentation in terms 
of relative positions of employees in larger 
and smaller companies have been observed 
in the UK and Ireland, as well as in Sou-
thern European countries (cf. Lapeyre and 
Blassel, 2003), with which Croatia shares 
some institutional and cultural features. 
Furthermore, high levels of unemployment 
in general and long-term unemployment in 
particular create another group of outsiders 
- labour market participants who fail to se-
cure any jobs in the official economy at all. 
Some of the long-term unemployed may be 
active in the unofficial economy, but the 
majority of that group forms the segment 
that occupies the worst-off position in the 
labour market29.
Labour market segmentation is caused 
by various factors. There is an underlying 
tendency, both within corporations and at 
the societal level, of interest groups captu-
ring their share and ignoring opportunities 
where co-ordinated strategic restraint from 
maximal short-term claims could make 
most actors better off. Firstly, ineffective 
judicial system makes the rectification of 
any rights violations difficult and costly. 
That is particularly problematic for low-
wage workers, whose socio-economic sta-
tus makes it more difficult for them to utilise 
the totality of their legal rights. On the other 
hand, their contractual rights are likely to be 
limited due to their weak negotiating power, 
unless this problem is moderated by unioni-
sation and collective bargaining. However, 
unionisation is often ineffective or openly 
discouraged by the employers, as in the ca-
ses of various small-size private employers, 
as well as larger retail chains. Furthermore, 
29 It may be interesting to look at gender and regional differences that could also contribute to segmentation 
processes. As for gender issues, the differential in employment rates of men and women in 2002 amounted to 
13.1 percent. That was somewhat higher than in the EU ﬁrst wave accession countries, but lower than the aver-
age differential in EU countries. However, in this regard men were more strongly affected by transition. Menʼs 
employment rate has fallen twice as much as women  ʼemployment rate. As indicated above, wage differentials 
between men and women are persistent but seem to be relatively low, although more precise calculations are 
needed. On the other hand, there are substantial regional unemployment differences; labour demand is strong 
only in few counties (Zagreb, Istria and Primorsko-goranska), whereas counties with a large proportion of rural 
population are particularly disadvantaged. Such conditions are mainly due to extensive regional differences in 
economic development, which have been ampliﬁed by war and low labour mobility. Effective regional policy
that could rectify some of these disparities still needs to be developed.
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the activities of trade unions and system of 
collective bargaining are steered in favour 
of those employed in the public sector and 
some state-owned companies. For example, 
the trade unions in state-owned utility mo-
nopolies regularly resort to political tactics 
to gain concessions from the management, 
and, indirectly, from the government. That 
has resulted in a privileged position of 
such employees, effectively prevented re-
structuring of such companies, and fuelled 
similar wage claims of the public sector 
employees. Moreover, the lack of effective 
dialogue between social partners at various 
levels prevents focusing on constructive 
and proactive solutions, and hinders the ef-
fectiveness of the attempted labour market 
reforms. Finally, the economic and social 
policy measures are unsystematic and often 
seem to be motivated by short-term political 
goals. Consequently, they do not address the 
needs of the disadvantaged employees and 
the unemployed sufficiently.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The current introduction of more flexi-
ble industrial relations provides an oppor-
tunity for rethinking the functioning of 
the labour market institutions. The levels 
and structure of unemployment necessi-
tate action, which should include more at-
tention to the processes that govern these 
institutions. We can expect that the labour 
market reform in Croatia will follow a pat-
tern usually negotiated in various European 
countries. This pattern comprises of the 
following: preservation of the basic system 
of employment protection (as a safeguard 
against unfair behaviour), liberalisation of 
fixed-term, temporary and part-time em-
ployment contracts, decentralisation of col-
lective bargaining, reduction of passive la-
bour market policies, and the reallocation of 
resources towards the active ones (Samek 
Lodovici, 2000a). Although such reforms 
are likely to enable an easier entry into the 
labour market, they might also exacerbate 
the existing segmentation tendencies – for 
example, by loosening the means of the in-
stitutional protection of low-skill workers. 
Unequal distribution of the cost of refor-
ms is a challenge to policy makers whose 
resolution requires simultaneous attention 
to economic efficiency and socio-political 
legitimacy. The effectiveness of labour 
market reforms depends on their linkages 
with other policy measures. At least, labour 
market policies need to be devised and im-
plemented in combination with adequate 
and consistent policies tackling enterprise 
development, education, and social poli-
cy. The success of reforms also requires a 
much more effective functioning of social 
(and particularly judicial) institutions. The 
effectiveness of the legal system is currently 
reduced by slowness and occasional incon-
sistencies, and that creates problems regar-
ding the rectification of wrongdoings.
In the short term, there is an urgent 
need to improve the system of resolution 
of labour disputes, which would include 
more effective mediation and arbitration 
mechanisms and thus unburden the judi-
ciary. A more efficient resolution of existing 
labour disputes should serve as a deterren-
ce mechanism against unfair behaviour. 
Another important issue is the creation of 
more trust among the social partners in bi-
partite and tripartite social dialogue at the 
national, regional and local levels. That 
could facilitate a more constructive nego-
tiation climate and foster the implementa-
tion of a more effective and mutually be-
neficial system of collective bargaining, as 
well as co-operation in the achievement of 
commonly agreed goals. The issue of so-
cial dialogue is particularly important for 
SMEs, which account for a growing propor-
tion of the economy, and for the majority of 
the newly created jobs. At the same time, 
the social dialogue in them seems to be ra-
ther underdeveloped, and the protection of 
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employee rights is more problematic. This 
has to be complemented by restructuring 
of state-owned enterprises and a reform 
of the public sector in general. Increasing 
their efficiency will help curb the differen-
tials between the employees of public and 
private sectors. Moreover, sustainable in-
creases in labour market demand can only 
come through enterprise development and 
attraction of investment. As the example 
of Ireland demonstrates, that requires ade-
quate economic policy measures coupled 
with social partnership. However, above 
else is the need for the highly competent 
and productive labour force, which requi-
res the provision of opportunities for life-
long learning, and the co-evolution of the 
educational system with the labour market 
demand. That entails an upgrade of com-
petencies of major institutional players in 
the labour market (relevant government 
ministries and agencies, employer associa-
tions, trade unions, Economic and Social 
Council, Croatian Employment Service, 
Employment Inspectoral Agencies). Further 
necessary measures include tackling of the 
undeclared economy and the improvement 
of the situation of the working poor. Finally, 
reconsideration of both passive and active 
labour market policies seems indispensa-
ble, with the aim of creating an integrative 
approach that will bring about synergies 
between active and passive policies and 
measures, as well as periodical evaluation 
of their effectiveness. Hereby the emphasis 
should be on the improving the skills, em-
ployability and the incentives of the unem-
ployed to actively search for a job. That is 
especially applicable to the long-term and 
low-skill unemployed persons, who are in 
relatively worst-off positions among the 
unemployed.
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